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Strategizing In the Context of Transitional Economy: The Interplay between Firm Level and 
Institutional Logics  
 
Abstract 
Using the dual concepts of ‘dominant logic’ and institutional logics, this paper examines how senior 
managers in the context of transition economy navigate between the competing logics of state- 
dependency and market-dependency when seeking to explain their firms’ business strategies. By 
comparing accounts in matched-paired case studies drawn from state versus private sectors, the 
study reveals how top teams develop shared dominant logics which are patterned in a manner which 
reveals that the degree of state-dependency was the critical variable and that market was a 
subsidiary variable.  Further, the study found that it was the top teams in the state-owned firms 
which articulated the more confident, proactive expansionary plans, while the top managers in the 
private sector firms presented more cautious and incremental business strategies. Contextual 
conditions are described which help account for these contrasting patterns. 
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Introduction 
Drawing on the idea of  ‘dominant logic’ (Obloj, Obloj & Pratt, 2010; Prahalad & Bettis 1986) and 
institutional logics (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton, 2004; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; 
Thornton and Ocasio, 2008, Dunn and Jones, 2010; Greenwood et al, 2010) this study investigates 
how senior managers in the context of a transitional economy responded to competing institutional 
demands of   the state and  the market. Specifically, this paper addresses the question: In a highly 
contested and uncertain transitional economy environment, what logics do strategic level managers 
draw upon and how do these logics manifest in organisational strategies?  This paper seeks to 
further our understanding of the interplay between firm level logic and institutional logics and how 
and under what conditions senior managers use state-favoured versus market logics to manage 
businesses in environments that send ambiguous and contradictory signals.  We seek to explore the 
underlying assumptions and thought processes of senior executives taking the case of two firms in 
public and private sectors in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Firm level dominant logic essentially refers to how firms “conceptualize and make critical resource 
allocation decisions” (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986, p. 490). In the context of transitional economy the 
bases of competition, organisational structure and the survival of firms are affected by the dynamic, 
volatile, changes.  Such volatile changes require senior managers to interpret and decide on what it 
takes their organisations to success in a radically evolving environment. As firms enact the 
changing market oriented environment, it becomes important for them to develop plausible business 
strategies, processes, practices which align with a new environment.   In this way, the emergent 
dominant logic manifests into observable organisational features, as well as more tacitly in 
organisational values and culture which facilitate decision making on key organisational issues.  
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However, recent studies show that the empirical support for the impact of dominant logic has been 
relatively weak (Obloj & Pratt, 2005; Obloj, Pratt & Obloj 2010). Moreover, this construct is rarely 
applied in transitional economy context; what role might logics play in interpreting managerial 
strategising in transitional economies? The question is especially interesting in the context of those 
economies transitioning from a socialist economic system to a market economy as such contexts 
suggest truly fundamental shifts in underlying logics. A study of dominant logics in such settings 
offers the potential to further our understanding of the concept.   
 As cultural beliefs and rules, institutional logics shape actors cognitions and behaviours (Dunn and 
Jones, 2010, Friedland and Alford, 1991; Greenwood et al 2010; Thornton, 2004; Thornton and 
Ocasio, 2008,).  Logics focus decision maker attention on specific sets of issues and solutions 
(Ocasio, 1997), and consequently they influence organizations’ decisions as to whether to adopt 
specific practices. Examples of institutional logics include editorial versus market orientation in the 
publishing businesses (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), a national versus community banking orientation 
(Marquis  & Lounsbury, 2007), and regulatory logic versus market logic in finance (Haverman and 
Rao, 1997, Lounsbury, 2002). Such logics provide guiding principles to align organisational 
practices with specific problems and rhetorics accounting for why organizations should change to 
incorporate new practices (Kono et al., 1998; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006).  The study of 
institutional logics in a transitional (developing) economy context is rare.  Previous studies focus 
much more on factors that constrain strategic transformation as a response to institutional changes 
(e.g., pace of change (Newman, 2000), governance (Filatotchev et al., 2003), factor markets (Spicer 
et al., 2000), historical imprinting (Kriauciunas and Kale, 2006), network-based strategy (Peng 
2000; Peng and Heath, 1996; Peng and Luo, 2000), and building legitimacy (Ahlstrom et al 2008). 
Hence, there is a need to examine how senior managers in different organisational contexts 
construct a patterned set of firm-level logics which embody the characteristics of the industry and 
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strategy of the firm but shaped by the wider field level logics.  This paper, in particular, seeks to 
examine how and in what conditions  firm-level logics intersect with field level institutional logics 
as the latter were found to shape the underlying assumptions and beliefs about what actions and 
practices are desirable and appropriate in given institutional contexts ( Lounsbury, 2007; Shipilov, 
Greve & Rowley, 2010; van Gestel and Hillebrand, 2011). Ethiopia, which exhibits many of the 
characteristics of a society and economy in transition, serves as a rich context within which to 
examine the interplay between dominant logic and institutional logics. 
Notably, this paper makes three specific contributions to the literature. First, it provides insight into 
the use of dominant and institutional logics in the little examined transition economies in Africa. In 
doing so it not only integrates strategic and institutional theories but also provides insights into 
‘why’ and ‘how’ senior managers navigate through competing logics in order to succeed and thrive 
in environment characterised by high level instability, uncertainty and ambiguity.  In doing so, the 
paper makes a significant second contribution by focusing not only on the nature and consequences 
of institutional logics but also on the organisational features that heighten the use of them 
(Greenwood et al, 2011). Finally, it is postulated that the insights drawn from this work to be 
relevant to other transition economies where the government retains control over the resources and 
connections. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Review of relevant literature is presented in section 
two. Then, the research methodology is outlined in section three. Findings are presented in section 
four.  Discussion and implication of the research are presented in the final section. 
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Theoretical backdrop 
Dominant logics  
Obloj et al. (2010, p. 151) define dominant logic as ‘the manner in which firms conceptualize and 
make critical resource allocation decisions, and over time develop mental maps, business models, 
and processes that become organizational recipes’. Their use of this concept is similar to other terms 
such as ‘mind-sets’ (Nadkarni & Perez, 2007), ‘interconnected choices’ (Siggielkov, 2001), and 
‘strategic frames’ (Huff, 1982).  In their original formulation, Prahalad and Bettis (p. 491) define a 
dominant logic as a ‘mind set or a worldview or conceptualization of the business and 
administrative tools to accomplish goals and make decisions in that business.’   
There are two main relevant dimensions to the way dominant logics operate in the context of 
managerial action. First, dominant logics serve as an information filter – they help to organise the 
potentially chaotic inflow of information. Second, they provide the basis for establishing routines of 
action.  
Dominant logic as an ‘information filter’ draws on previous work on the content of managerial 
cognition and mind-sets (Boissot and Li, 2006; Gavetti et al, 2005; von Krogh, Erat, & Macus, 
2000; and Walsh, 1995).  Bettis and Prahalad (1995) and Bettis (2000) treat dominant logic as a 
knowledge structure that evolves over a substantial period of time based on experiences with the 
characteristics of the core business; tasks critical to success; performance measures; and values and 
norms evolution. This knowledge structure works as a set of perceptual and conceptual filters that, 
as von Krogh et al., (2000) argue, ‘sifts’ information from the environment. Routines and learning 
form the second dimension of the dominant logic. Routines include ‘specific corporate level 
functions’ such as ‘allocating resources, formulating business strategies, and setting and monitoring 
performance targets’ (Grant, 1998, Obloj et al 2010, 153). Learning on the other hand, occurs 
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through actions and experience (March, 1996; Zander & Kogut, 1995) and later can become 
codified in organisational rules and routines (Miller, 1996).These dimensions thus are 
interdependent. The way in which this process occurs is explained by Boissot and Li (p. 320) who 
suggest that the ‘codification’ of experiences occurs and that this is accompanied by abstraction that 
reduces ‘the number of categories required for achieving a viable representation of the experience, 
and hence the entropy associated with them’. These characteristics confront an unusual degree of 
challenge in an environment where the very fundamentals of business are open to deep questioning. 
How might a dominant logic establish itself in a context such as that found in Ethiopia where a 
strong legacy of state planning remains (with many of the institutional supports and cultural 
artefacts still in place) whilst a new market-focused logic is simultaneously championed?  In 
ambiguously and rapidly changing environments such as that typified by Ethiopia, an appropriate  
firm level managerial logic that fits the new world order should presumably provide a valuable 
advantage when compared with legacy logics based on assumptions of state preferment and 
selective protection.  
 
Institutional logics 
Logics are understood to originate within the societal sectors such as the professions, corporations, 
the state, the market, the family and religion (Friedland and Alford, 1991, Thornton, 2004, Dunn 
and Jones, 2010). Logics are socially shared, deeply held assumptions and values that form a 
framework for reasoning, provide criteria for legitimacy, and help organize time and space 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton, 2004; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). Embodied in practices and 
ideas, institutional logics can shape the rules of the game in a context where the rules are ambiguous 
and subject to sudden change. There are three strands of research in this area (Shipilov and Rowley, 
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2010, p.846). The first strand of this research sought to examine how a dominant institutional logic 
originates and uniformly shapes organizations, either reinforcing the spread of a practice that 
conforms to the increasingly dominant institutional logic (Thornton, 2002) or accelerating the 
abandonment of an old, increasingly illegitimate logic (Davis, Diekmann, & Tinsley, 1994).  The 
second strand of research has focused on showing how contention between opposing logics leads to 
fragmentation of institutional fields (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007; Shipilov et al 2010). More 
recently the third strand of research sought to examine how hybrid organisations respond to 
multiple logics ( for example, Pache and Santos, 2010; Kodeih and Greenwood, 2014). This paper 
draws primarily on the first and the third strand of research. 
  There is a well-established link between logics and practices (e.g., Lounsbury 2007; Thornton, 
2002). It is also recognised that organisational fields are usually typified by multiple, often 
conflicting logics (Reay and Hinings, 2005, Reay and Hinings, 2009; Greenwood, et al. 2010).  Yet 
our understanding about how and in what context organisations use multiple, competing, logics is 
very limited.  Such understanding is particularly important in transition economies context where 
firms face a situation in which institutions and their responses often change rapidly due  ‘weak’ 
formal institutional frameworks and normative and cognitive institutions that are not necessarily 
supportive of  managing businesses in an evolving free market environment (Busenitz, et al., 2000  
In transitionary situations,  thus there will be uncertainty about which institutional logics will shape 
the cognitions and behaviours of senior executives as they seek to enact the transition to a new 
market-oriented economic environment. In such environments, firms may combine competing (or 
sometimes contradictory) institutional logics which may ‘increase the flexibility or the scope for 
strategic actions’ (Jackson, 2009, p.609). We set out to uncover how senior managers in the 
transitionary context of modern Ethiopia would explain their logics of action. 
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Context 
Ethiopia is a land of contrast. Ethiopia is the second most populous country in Africa, is widely 
known for over dependence on a volatile agricultural economy that is susceptible to recurrent severe 
droughts, an unstable political situation and disruptions caused by a long term civil war (Author A).  
The political process that brought first the Derg (the socialist regime) and then the current 
government to power (in 1974 and 1991, respectively) was both unpredictable and violent. The 
recent study concludes that ‘economic insecurity pervades Ethiopia’s modern history, with the rule 
of law, the enforcement of contracts and the security of property each configured on a shaky 
political base’ ( Geda, 2008, p. 116). 
The formal institutional framework in Ethiopia is extremely weak and unstable and typified by high 
levels of market imperfections, the absence of market-supporting institutions, low contract-
enforcing mechanisms, underdeveloped infrastructure and communication networks and slowly 
evolving judicial system which is strictly controlled by the ruling party and the government (Miller 
et al. 2011,World Bank, 2009). The country’s financial system remains underdeveloped. As of 
2012, it has only three state-owned and 14 ComB2s with the total of 1017 bank branches which 
‘serve’ a population of 90 million people. Stock exchange and capital markets are not yet 
operational. Industrial structure is dominated by a relatively small number of government-owned 
firms and conglomerates, featuring a high degree of market concentration, and is characterized by 
relatively high administrative barriers to entry (Ciuriak and Preville, 2010).  
Further, the state-owned firms in strategic sectors and enterprises affiliated to the ruling political 
party are buffered by the government   from competitive and market forces. Public enterprises still 
play a major role in many areas, including the financial, energy, and communication sectors 
(Author A 2007, 2010; IMF, 2008; Miller et al. 2011). Government development policies provide 
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business opportunities for enterprises in ‘strategic’ sectors when many other enterprises are exposed 
to cut-throat competition. These situations have created ‘state-favoured’ contexts for conducting 
business activities.  Enterprises embedded in strong networks  with the politicians in power (state-
and party-owned firms) are the primary beneficiaries of any resource allocation by the government 
and perceived to have an insider information about and preferential access to mega public sector 
contracts (Author A, 2010). In contrast, managers in the private sector might be expected to use 
more informal substitutes because they have less ability to use state-based networks. The 
underdevelopment of formal institutions and the state preferment may compel managers to form 
distinctive dominant logics to shape the ‘rules of the game’ in their favour. Conceivably, senior 
managers exposed to competitive market pressures amidst institutional fluxes and voids would tend 
to develop ‘market-dependent’ logics.  
 
Methodology 
Research design 
A matched –paired case study approach was deployed with data collected over a period of two 
years.  Matched cases are considered to be relevant for this study for three reasons. First, this 
approach ‘enables comparisons that clarify whether an emergent finding is simply idiosyncratic to a 
single case or consistently replicated by another case (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Second, this 
research strategy helps to answer the “how” and “why” research questions in unexplored research 
areas (Edmondson & McManus, 2007) and when the context is not well understood. Third, this 
approach makes the assumptions underlying the selection of cases more explicit, and hence they 
facilitate transparency (Nielsen, 2011) 
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In a matched-pair logic, two organisations were purposively selected in this study for similarity in 
industry (banking) and market they operate in, as well as for difference in ownership (a state-owned 
bank versus a newly-formed ComB2).  Thus, banking sector similarity would allow comparing the 
impact the ownership types have on why and to what extent senior managers in both organisations 
draw on the competing logics of state-dependent and market dependent logics (cf, Tarrow, 2004) 
over the time.  In doing so, this approach is useful to make conclusions that show difference in the 
types of ownership might be the main cause of any differences in the ways and the extent to which 
senior managers in the sample organisations use the competing logics (see, Nielsen, 2011).    
Access to a sizeable group of Ethiopian senior managers was by no means easy. It was secured 
through arduous negotiations over several months, facilitated by a wide variety of gatekeepers in 
formal and informal networks that emerged via a snowballing method. The basic profile of these 
two banks is shown below in Table 1. 
 
[Inset Table 1 about here] 
 
ComB1 has been established according to the laws of Ethiopia in 1963. The only shareholder is the 
state.  It has a very strong resources base:  human and financial capital, assets, customers, and 
widespread branch networks. In 2010/11 it had 417 bank branches (43% of all bank branches in the 
country), 42 per cent of credit market, 61 per cent of deposit account and 10,753 employees (NBE 
2010/11 Annual Report, ComB1 2011 Annual Report). In contrast, ComB2 is the first commercial 
bank to be established as a Private Limited Company by the Ethiopian nationals in December 1994 
and started banking operations in February 1995.  In 2010/11 ComB2 had 2724 employees, 70 bank 
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branches (7.2%  of the total)  and had 6.9  per cent, 5.8 per cent and 11 per cent share in  capital 
base,  deposit mobilisation and credit market, respectively (see table 1) 
Both firms operate in the banking sector, serve similar types of customers and face the same 
regulatory environment.  Further, the two banks operate in buffered, less competitive, markets due 
the policy restriction in place that prohibits the entry of foreign financial intermediaries into the 
country. However, they differ in ownership types and this, as to be shown later, has a number of 
implications for their level of proactiveness, external orientation, logics enacted and strategies 
pursued. 
Data Collection and Analysis   
We used various data sources.  These included face to face interviews with senior managers, 
interviews with national level experts, analysts and policy makers to frame the research context, as 
well as secondary sources including organisational reports, industry reports and data from various 
sources.  
Primarily, two-phase face-to-face interviews with 22 senior managers in different functional areas 
were conducted to obtain a wide spectrum of perspectives. Two criteria used to select these 
managers were that they hold senior management role and were members of the organisation’s 
decision making body so that they were able to provide temporal accounts of their interaction with 
the environment and strategies used.  
A semi-structured interview protocol was used for teasing-out managers’ interpretations of major 
organisational issues. These included their experience of the business environment and changes 
within it; the ways in which they adapt to, and cope with, the demands of organisational context 
through leaning and routines; the types of plausible business strategies and related actions and 
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practices considered ‘appropriate’.  Semi-structured interview questionnaires provided some 
direction to the respondent while also permitting additional open response beyond the initial 
question. Hence, the interview questions prompted managers to reflect upon their personal 
interpretations of the nature of the business environment and how these may have influenced the 
development of strategic responses in their organisations.  These face-to-face interviews averaged 
around 90 minutes. Interviews were recorded verbatim and transcribed professionally for coding 
and analysis. Respondents were assured of anonymity.  The researchers were conscious of the 
potential difficulties of being seen to impose confessional-style interviewing of a western tradition 
in this very different context. 
To contextualise the study, at national level, we conducted interviews with 18 high level experts, 
policy makers and analysts who have thorough knowledge and experience of the issues facing 
businesses during a transition period. The composition of the purposively selected interviewees 
were from relevant government ministries (5 senior officials), agencies (six directors), umbrella 
business associations (four presidents/board members), an economic research institute (two 
directors/senior analyst) and the central bank (director) to understand their perspectives on the 
radical changes taking place in the country and their implications for the business organisations. 
Other sources of information included archival and published materials about the case study 
organisations, relevant publications on Ethiopia by international organisations, industry/sector 
reports, research and promotional materials by the government agencies.  
As is typical in inductive research, we began with in-depth analysis of each case from the 
perspective of our research question (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). Two researchers read the cases 
independently in order to form their own views of each narrative. The goal of this within-case 
analysis was to identify themes and patterns for each case independently, in relation to the research 
question of understanding the role of various logics in organisational adaptation and responses.  
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We then turned to matched-paired case analysis in which the insights that emerged from each case 
were compared with those from the other case to identify consistent patterns and themes across the 
cases (Eisenhardt, 1991; Yin, 2003).  Major themes and constructs were grouped by patterns of 
interest to facilitate comparisons. Significant discrepancies and agreements in the emergent analysis 
were noted and subjected to further exploration with the data. During the data analysis phase we 
were conscious of the need to achieve trustworthiness and to minimise researchers’ bias by being 
reflexive and establishing consensus in our interpretation.  
 
Findings  
Differentiated logics: Market-dependent versus ‘state-favoured’ logics 
Organisations are often subject to respond to competing, sometimes, conflicting logics in order to 
satisfy the demands of institutional and market environments.  Prima facie, both case study 
organisations face similar market, competitive and institutional environment (regulative, normative 
and cultural/cognitive) and hence one would expect that they draw on similar institutional logics for   
strategy making. However, the two banks examined were differentiated in the extent to which they 
draw on competing institutional logics: the ComB2’s strategies and actions were shaped by a 
conservative and cautious ‘market’ logic whereas senior managers in ‘state-favoured’ bank were 
able to hybridise the logics and in consequence implemented organisational strategies, process and 
practices underpinned by the two logics. For instance, one of the vice presidents of the ComB2 
explains the then perception and how such perception shaped the consequential actions: 
  We were excited to grab opportunities from the ensuing changes in policy environment which allowed 
private business to operate in this country. However, it has been a challenge for us to plan ahead, acquire the 
required resources and manage business due to ambiguities and uncertainties. ..... we felt that businesses are 
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clearly demarcated along the ownership lines which provided them with differential access points for 
resources and market.  In consequence, we thought that our existence depended mainly on serving our 
customers and shareholders whilst being alert about the frequent twist and turns in government policy and 
regulations. 
Thus, one possible explanation for such a differentiated application of pertinent logics can be traced 
back to one of the salient organisational features, the ownership type, which determines the extent 
to which various logics influence senior managers’ interpretation and subsequent organisational 
actions. It would appear that while ComB2 managers were willing – and were impelled - to 
consider rapid and sustained growth in marketplace, they were in fact rather more timid and 
uncertain about this when compared with senior managers in the state-dependent bank.  
Due to their political appointment, the ComB1 managers had very close ties to the government and 
access to political power. Such networks and power were pivotal for state-owned bank managers to 
have access to timely information, resources and state-sponsorship. Hence their experience of the 
institutional environment influenced their interpretation of it as conducive and which presented 
them with the opportunities for action. The ComB1 managers developed networks for accessing 
insider information relating to policies, markets and regulations to their advantages. The ComB1 
managers used government reform, restructuring and capacity building programmes (e.g., financial 
sector reform programme) as a frame of reference for organisational transformation, change 
management and to identify, develop and execute business strategies. Indeed, senior managers used 
‘institutional transformation’ logic as  a subset of ‘state-favoured’ logic, as this was cascaded from 
the above and used as a frames of reference to undertake bank-wide organisational changes. One of 
the senior ComB1 presidents explains: 
As the state-owned institution, the government appoints senior executives and establishes Board of Directors 
to oversee the activities and performance of this bank. We enjoy support in our strategy development and 
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organisational transformation programme through the financial sector reform programme and the 
establishment of authority which looks after and oversees the state-owned banks and an insurance company. 
Our missions, visions and values are thus informed by the concurrent government policy and initiatives. 
The ComB1 also benefited from international professional consultancy services such as Ernst & 
Young and the Bank of Scotland-Ireland to undertake organisational transformation but there were 
felt tensions how to incorporate logics coming from different institutional spheres (cf, Reay and 
Hinings, 2005).  Hence, the ComB1 was highly dependent on the government for its strategizing 
practices, critical resources and for undertaking organisational changes which underpinned its 
organisational processes, routines and learning.    
Importantly though, senior managers in this bank were not limited to draw on the ‘state favoured’ 
logic alone. Several senior managers of ComB1 considered the banking market became competitive 
as the ComB2s were making a significant stride in taking market share in deposit, loan, capital and 
branch networks. So they were compelled to take actions for impression management and 
organisational transformation to cope with competitive and market pressures. In particular, one of 
the vice president identified ‘service delivery capacity and efficiency to have become the only 
differentiating factors given similar products and price structure of the banking industry’.  
Ultimately, they viewed ‘service quality and customer satisfaction’ to be strategic performance 
indicators though not  disregarding the traditional financial performance yardsticks. Thus they were 
considering positioning the ComB1 with differentiated products and pricing strategy, and quality 
customer service. There were two reasons for this. First, the opening up of the banking market for 
domestic competition during a transition period meant that senior managers in the ComB1 also had 
to interpret the market and competitive environments and ‘what constitute appropriate behaviour 
and how to succeed’ (Thornton, 2004, p.70). Second, there was the need for managers to legitimate 
their decisions and actions to external and internal stakeholders through adoption of best business 
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practices.  Thus, they identified commitment to maximizing shareholder value, an ability to satisfy 
customers and adoption of customer-friendly banking technology as the ways forward. These 
strategic organisational objectives were to be achieved through enhanced financial intermediation, 
capable, skilled, employees and use of international best practices when offering products and 
services. Thus, market logic came into use when considering organisational success in the 
marketplace.  
The foregoing analysis shows how managers use hybrid of logics, of course at different levels of 
emphasis, when enacting the environment in which their organisation operates.  Senior managers 
facing, on the one hand, the top down changes imposed by the state, and the market competitive 
pressure, on the other, sought to negotiate the interplay between the two competing logics. This 
analysis is in line with Seo and Creed (2002) work that illuminates the subtle interplay between 
institutional embeddedness and transformational agency in institutional change. It also is in accord 
with the study that highlighted change agents and their power in shaping the character of change in 
the public sector (Townley, 2002). We provide evidence in the next section on the organisational 
manifestations of hybridised logics in firm level logics which underlie business strategy and 
associated practices and routines. 
In contrast, the ComB2 decision making and actions were shaped by ‘market’ logic. The market as 
both an economic and institutional structure was the prime point of institutional reference.  This 
ComB2 had much less access to political power, and ties to the government were weak.  But, they 
were cognizant of the opportunities available due to the development policy that favours firms in 
strategic sectors (e.g., financial, energy, telecommunication, export). Indeed, most of top executives 
in ComB2 were senior managers in the state-owned banks during the socialist regime and had a 
sufficient experience of state interference in private businesses and how to co-opt. The vice 
president explains: 
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Most of our senior management were ex- senior managers in the state commercial bank. For example, the 
president was the managing director of the state commercial bank and then the governor of the National Bank 
of Ethiopia. I also served in various senior management positions over two decades. So we have a very 
capable and experienced management team with thorough understanding of the banking business, the 
character and types of customers and the ways in which to cope with the state rules and regulations.  
 Such experience helped the ComB2 senior managers use informal networks with some influential 
actors and capitalise on their shareholder base to validate their business operation as desirable and 
appropriate in a changed business environment.  
The ComB2 managers saw an aspect of the government policy as a time-bound opportunity that 
should be enacted. Despite the advantages to be had from the current policy which bars entry of 
foreign financial institutions, they argued for a policy aimed at liberalisation of the financial sector 
at a moderate pace. They perceived that such liberalization would enable the development of 
competitive and marketing capabilities through forming alliance or merger with foreign financial 
institutions. Thus, they saw the current policy environment as limiting their scope for action.  They 
were, for the time being at least, highly alert to signals from the government concerning 
commitment to open international markets. They sensed the influence of most powerful actor 
making it difficult to fully-fledged market logic and hence gave priority   to become customer- 
focused and create value for their shareholders as a way of business success.  The market logic 
guided ‘organising’ and provided these managers ‘with rationales for action’ (Dunn & Jones, 2010, 
p.114).   
Links between logics and organisational strategy and practices  
Consistent with previous research, this study indicates a link between the logics, plausible 
organisational strategies and processes and routines underpinning the chosen strategies (Greenwood 
et al, 2010; Lounsbury, 2007; Thornton, 2002, 2004).  First, senior managers in both banks used 
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both information filter view (to interpret the environment and identify business opportunities) and 
learning and adoption of routines (to allocate firm resources) dimensions of dominant managerial 
logics but with noted differences. Managers in the state-owned bank, because of their perceived 
solid sponsorship-base, felt more confident in competing in financial market. They were optimistic 
about, and exhibited a high level of confidence on, the business environment. For example, one of 
the senior presidents interpreted: 
The political and policy environments are conducive for the banking industry in general and  for the ComB1 
in particular.  Restriction of entry of competing international banks into the market is the major advantage for 
the ComB1 to continue its dominance in the domestic financial sector and it gives the Bank an opportunity to 
consolidate itself in terms of structure and systems, and upgraded managerial skills. The legal environment is 
also favourable for vibrancy and effectiveness of the financial sector.  The recent introduction of the 
foreclosure law, for instance, helped us to recover payment from the defaulting customers’ properties sale. 
The recent economic growth is also another factor for the planned Bank’s business expansion. 
 Optimistic interpretation of the political and policy environment as conducive underlined their 
business practices. These analyses were closely linked with their state-favoured logics. 
In contrast, senior managers in the ComB2 were less confident and pessimistic about their 
organisation’s current and the future direction.  For example, a senior manager in the private sector 
bank observed ‘None of the private firms in the financial sector are able competitors against the 
dominant ComB1 or multinationals’. Further, the accounts such as ‘people need to have confidence 
on the environment to invest’; ‘there is no a level playing field’; ‘policies and regulations change 
unpredictably and unexpectedly undermining the business confidence’; ‘still the party and the 
government play  predominant roles in the economy’; showed their interpretations of the business 
environment as threatening and unstable.   Further, they reported that they were unable to develop 
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sustainable networks and that the state enterprises with huge resources remain the main customers 
of the state-owned bank.  
Second, the study highlights the diversity in firms’ business strategies at the organisational level. In 
line with the literature on learning and adoption of routines, which relate to set corporate function 
and strategy formulation (Obloj et al. 2010; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), this study found that: a) the 
dominant logics reflected the shared mind-set of senior managers within a given firm and 
underpinned the identified  business strategies and, processes and routines underpinning them; and 
2) both firms experienced a diverse set of dominant managerial logics at organisational level and in 
consequence followed different business strategies (see table 2 below).   
 
[Inset Table 2 about here] 
 
Senior managers in both organisations used simplifying rules, cognitively, to operate in their 
marketplace based on the firm-specific dominant logic. For instance, the dominant logic in the 
ComB1, backed by the confidence in state-sponsored support, was to make the organisation a 
‘globally competitive commercial bank with best international practice’. Guided by this dominant 
logic, the bank engaged both in defensive and proactive strategies and put in place the requisite 
processes and routines. It pursued proactive strategies by pioneering new products to the market and 
introducing customer relationship services. To achieve its goals, the ComB1 managers engaged in 
three pronged strategy elements: process improvement, new product development and human 
resources development. Commonly shared managerial scripts were: ‘Business process 
reengineering improves processes in operational areas’; ‘We need to provide service through 
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customer-friendly banking technology’; ‘adopting benchmarking and best practices from abroad is 
essential for our successes’; ‘We need to diversify our product portfolios’, etc.  Such logics guided 
the resource allocation. Further, performance monitoring practices and learning by doing were used 
as a learning mechanism which informed subsequent behaviours and actions.    
The ComB2’s business model was based on organic growth through branch expansion to serve the 
local market. The senior team opted for incremental market expansion primarily through branch 
expansion and development of its human resources. These strategy elements were to be 
complemented by the use of banking technology, primarily, to improve efficiency in transaction 
processing and reporting.  Representative managerial scripts such as ‘more branches more 
customers’; ‘we make our services accessible and closer to people’; ‘employees are our valuable 
resources’, to mention some, served as simplifying rules to implementing their strategies. Regular 
management meetings, performance reviews and on-the-job trainings acted as a learning 
mechanism through which the detected weaknesses were to be addressed. But these attempts to 
secure efficiencies and to be competitive were not matched by a confidence to expand in other, 
more ambitious, ways.  
Third, the foregoing analysis suggests that some logics are more compelling to a certain category of 
organisations than others. Further, the analysis also shows that organisations could draw on multiple 
or competing logics but with unequal emphasis temporally or over time. For example, the state-
favoured logic of the ComB1 played a significant role in shaping the senior managers’ sensemaking 
of the environment, their view on required organisational changes and appropriate behaviours and 
actions. The government capacity building and the financial sector reform programmes drove this 
bank’s organisational transformation. Senior managers articulated their dominant firm level 
dominant logics to be ‘making ComB1 a globally competitive bank with international practices’. 
This framing signified the market-focus logic and guided resources allocations and adoption of 
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practices and process such as business process reengineering, customer friendly banking 
technology, introduction of new products, and the reconfiguration of its organisational structure and 
creation of new divisions.  Being in a position of high status, senior managers in the ComB1 used 
prescription underpinned by the state-favoured logic and complemented it with actions informed by 
the market logic.  In contrast, managers in the ComB2 were more dependent on market mechanisms 
and less on state-led institutional support to acquire resources and for their business operation. 
Along with drawing on a market-oriented logic, they also recognise the business benefits to be had 
from active engagement with customers and the bank shareholders. The senior manager explained:  
We are cognizant of who we are and how we should evolve in this challenging business environment where 
the public banks remain dominant. Our focus is thus on building our shareholder base to increase our 
operational capacity and to get closer to the customers.  Hence the focus of our strategy- branch expansion 
and providing satisfying customer service including the use of modern banking technology.  
Hence, shareholder logic was used as a subset of market logic to build the capital base of the 
business and make sense of changes in the environment. These two logics were complemented, to a 
lesser degree, by actively monitoring signals coming from the state institutions 
Notably, the two organisations varied in their dominant managerial logics and in consequence 
pursued different business strategies and gave different priorities to different elements of their 
strategy. The results indicate how the operating context shapes the dominant logics and how these 
in turn influence firms’ behaviours and business strategies. Interestingly, comparing the pattern 
across the two cases, it would appear that the dominant logic of the state-owned bank demonstrates 
a higher level of proactiveness vis-a-vis the ComB2. Although surprising at first, a deeper 
examination reveals that the source of this pattern was the confidence engendered among senior 
managers in the state-owned bank which was induced by the strong partnerships that managers in 
these firms had forged with state actors, who were able to offer resources and protection.  Hence, 
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state-favoured logic  become  the prime guide that  enabled senior managers in the ComB1 to make 
sense of their situations and identify ‘appropriate’ strategies and actions for organisational success 
(cf, Greenwood et al, 2010). In contrast, the ComB2’s strategies and practices were shaped mainly 
by the market-dependent logic.   
 
Discussion, conclusions and implications 
Using the concepts of ‘dominant logic’ and ‘institutional logics’, this study examines the interplay 
between the two levels of  logics when senior managers engage in strategising in the context of a 
transitional economy.  Based on the matched pair cases studies, the paper casts light on dominant 
logic formation processes that underpin senior management’s strategic response to a rapidly 
unfolding and extremely uncertain business environment. It identified the co-existence of market-
dependent and state-favoured logics shaping management dominant logics at an organisational 
level. Ownership type is found to be a significant determinant in the use of state-favoured and 
market-dependent logics for providing a framework for reasoning, and concomitant criteria for 
legitimacy and appropriateness of organisational practices (Greenwood et al 2010; Thornton and 
Ocasio, 2008). Thus,   to what extent firms were able to access the required resources and business 
opportunities were shaped by the extent to which they were relied upon the competing logics of the 
state and the market.   Though not surprising, the study shows that the senior managers of the state-
owned bank was more informed, better advantaged, and more embedded in the state favoured logics 
and as a result, were more able develop strategy and competence which enable  the exploitation  
business opportunities than the ComB2 management (Haveman & Rao, 1997; Kraatz & Moore, 
2002).  
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These two logics also may compete for attention. The ComB1 case demonstrated how an 
organisation’s strategies and practices were underpinned by  the rational use both logics and how 
such use could vary over time. In contrast the ComB2’s business activities were principally shaped 
by a market-dependent logic.  The main reason for this was the fact that senior managers perceived 
they lacked the required legitimacy and the necessary political backing to access state-sponsored 
resources in the environment where the state retains control over the resources and networks 
(Author A, forthcoming).   Therefore, senior managers in the ComB2 faced equivocality and 
ambiguity when dealing with the state. The result was developing the ‘market-dependent’ logic to 
cope with institutional and market pressures. Perhaps not surprisingly, managers consequently 
believed that their organisational success depends more on meeting changing market needs and 
coping with competition. A market-constrained interpretation thus shaped senior management’s 
dominant logic, business strategies and underlying routines and processes at organisational level. 
One of the key conclusions of the study is that senior managers in the state-owned bank were more 
ambitious and confident than managers in the ComB2 and this was more important than sector or 
the market in which they operate. The study argues that currently there are institutional reasons 
(funding, sponsorship, privilege access to knowledge, resources, markets, people etc) and legacy 
reasons (command and control economy and socio-cultural) which help explain why many senior 
managers prioritise state over market.    
This study contributes to existing literature in a number of ways. The first contribution is in 
examining the heterogeneity of dominant logics at firm level and the co-existence of competing 
institutional logics that guided senior managements’ decision making on key organisational issues 
such as strategy and, process and routines underpinning the chosen strategies. In particular, it 
highlights the importance of developing capability that enables organisations to draw on broader 
repertoire of practices and actions informed by the competing logics.  
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The second contribution of this study is its extended focus; it centres not just on the nature and 
consequences of dominant firm-level logics but also on the sources that shape them.  It shows how 
shifts in the institutional logics (from legacy to either market dependent or state-favoured or to 
both) created differentiated organisational strategies and prioritising of different strategy elements. 
Hence, it adds to the previous studies that demonstrate how changes in the logics result in different 
outcomes such as variations in practices ( Lounsbury, 2007; Reay & Hinings, 2005) and 
organizational structures (Thornton, 2002) as well as studies that seek to identify the forces that 
cause shifts in the attention to and emphasis on particular logics (Dunn & Jones, 2010). This study, 
therefore, underscores the contested and competing nature of institutional logics within a given 
institutional environment (Schmitt and Jarzabkowski 2013). The relative dominance of a particular 
logic over the other in a given context may be moderated by the level of competition, sector, firm 
ownership type and firm resource endowments. 
The third contribution of this study is in extending the view that suggests that agents, such as senior 
managers embedded in different organisational contexts, by holding contrasting interpretations of 
the institutional rules at play and the changes required to compete effectively, engage in divergent 
clusters of practices (see Boyer, 2006).  In doing so, it links and extends the recent work of Lau and 
Bruton (2011) who examined the strategic orientations of business ventures in China and Russia in 
relation to the institutional legacies in these countries.  Moreover, this study adds to Lau and Bruton 
(2011) conceptualisation by clarifying the interplay of dominant logics and institutional factors and 
revealing more about the way in which senior managers navigate between state and market logics.  
Importantly, the study indicates how the heterogeneity of dominant logics across organisations in 
different socio-economic contexts can challenge prevailing assumptions about attitudes to risk and 
strategic development. These logics also appear to underpin contrasting firm level growth strategies.  
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Finally, the findings and conclusions of this study need to be considered alongside its limitations. 
The study was conducted in a single country and in matched-paired case study organisations in the 
banking sector. The patterns found could be tested more fully for theoretical replication in other 
African and Asian countries, where different institutional arrangements prevail.  Moreover, other 
industry sectors could be usefully compared, offering some variation to the organisational fields 
examined. In addition, future research could usefully delve deeper into the range of alternative 
growth strategies considered by managers in similar conditions and the ways in which they evaluate 
these alternatives. 
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Table 1: Profile of the case study organisations as of 20101/11  
 Year 
established 
Capital 
(million 
Br) 
Branch  No of 
employees 
Deposit 
(million 
Br) 
 Loans 
& 
advance 
(Ml Br) 
No of 
interviewees 
ComB1 1963 6,262 417 10,753 85,159 17,796 11 
Share of 
total (%) 
  
39.3 
 
43 
  
- 
 
60.5 
 
42.1 
 
ComB2  1995 1,104 70 2,724 8,045 4,654 11 
Share of 
total (%) 
 6.9 7.2 - 5.8 11  
 
Table 2: Firm level dominant logics and business strategy 
Organisations Firm level 
dominant logic 
Learning and Routines (for decision-making & resource 
allocation) 
 
 
 
 
ComB1 
 
 
Globally 
competitive 
commercial 
bank with best 
international 
banking 
practice 
Main strategy Simplified rules Learning 
 
 
Proactive 
 New product 
development 
 Customer 
relationship service 
 Adoption of 
benchmarking and 
best international 
practices 
 Performance 
monitoring 
 Learning by doing  
 Regular  
management 
meeting 
 Emulating 
behaviour and 
practices from 
overseas 
Defensive  Process improvement 
 Customer-friendly 
banking technology 
 
ComB1 
 
Leading 
domestic bank  
 
Organic 
Growth 
through branch 
expansion 
 Branch expansion 
 Increasing share 
holder  base 
 Customer orientation 
 Banking technology  
 
 Regular  
management 
meeting 
 Performance  
reviews  
 On-the-job training 
 Informal 
networking 
 
